





In economic decision making, outcomes are described in terms of risk (uncertain outcomes with certain probabilities) and ambiguity
(uncertain outcomes with uncertain probabilities). Humans are more averse to ambiguity than to risk, with a distinct neural system
suggested as mediating this effect. However, there has been no clear disambiguation of activity related to decisions themselves from
perceptualprocessingofambiguity.Inafunctionalmagneticresonanceimaging(fMRI)experiment,wecontrastedambiguity,definedas
a lack of information about outcome probabilities, to risk, where outcome probabilities are known, or ignorance, where outcomes are
completelyunknownandunknowable.WemodifiedpreviouslylearnedpavlovianCSstimulisuchthattheybecameanambiguouscue
andcontrastedevokedbrainactivitybothwithanunmodifiedpredictiveCS(riskycue),andacuethatconveyednoinformationabout
outcome probabilities (ignorance cue). Compared with risk, ambiguous cues elicited activity in posterior inferior frontal gyrus and
posterior parietal cortex during outcome anticipation. Furthermore, a similar set of regions was activated when ambiguous cues were







Many predictions an organism makes about the world contain
uncertainty. In decision making, economists distinguish differ-
ent kinds of uncertainty. Risk refers to situations in which we
knowthepreciseprobabilitiesofeachoutcome(Bernoulli,1738).
Decision making under risk is axiomized in expected utility the-
ory to provide the basis of rational choice (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). These axioms are violated when outcome
probabilities are not known with certainty (that is, they do not
correspond to a point estimate), a situation referred to as ambi-
guity (Ellsberg, 1961).
People tend to avoid outcomes associated with ambiguity
(Becker and Brownson, 1964; Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Larson,
1980; Curley et al., 1986; Pulford and Colman, 2008), where one
criticalfeatureislackofinformationaboutoutcomeprobabilities
(Larson, 1980; Camerer, 1995). It has been suggested that the
amygdala and dorsomedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex
mediate decision making under ambiguity (Hsu et al., 2005).
However, choices based on ambiguous monetary gambles are
also reported to engage lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula,
and parietal regions (Huettel et al., 2006). A limitation of both
thesestudiesisthattheyconflateactivityassociatedwiththeper-
ception of ambiguity and decisions that ensue from this percep-
tion. Brain activations in these studies might therefore be attrib-
utable to decision making as well as to what has been termed in a
recent neuroeconomic framework the representation process,
that is, the identification and assessment of external and internal
states (Rangel et al., 2008). Furthermore, since both studies used
ambiguous rewarding outcomes, it is not known whether brain
areasactivatedinthesestudiesalsoencodeambiguityaboutaver-
sive outcomes.
The importance of a distinction between outcome prediction
with, and without, choice is embedded in theoretical accounts of
a distinction between pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.
Thus, pavlovian conditioning has often been used to study the
distinction between prediction and control (Dayan and Balleine,
2002). Accordingly, to study the neural basis of ambiguity per-
ception per se, we used a pavlovian conditioning procedure and
provided participants with ambiguous situations in which an
outcome prediction is made, but no actual decision required.
Within this context, we defined ambiguity as “known-to-be-
missing information, or not knowing relevant information that
could be known” (Camerer, 1995; p. 645). This definition of
ambiguity implies the fact that information is hidden from the
observer, and draws distinction with ignorance, in which proba-
bilities of outcomes are unknown, but are also unknowable (un-









1648 • TheJournalofNeuroscience,February11,2009 • 29(6):1648–1656We degraded previously learned conditioned visual stimuli
(CS)sothat,undertheambiguitycondition,theyonlyallowed
aprobabilisticpredictionofoutcomeprobabilities.Thesestimuli
were contrasted with the original CS that conveyed a point
estimate of outcome probabilities. Critically, to distinguish re-
sponses to lack of information alone from lack of information
thatcouldpotentiallybeknown(thatis,hiddeninformation),we
also included completely novel stimuli that carried no predictive
information, thereby corresponding to a uniform prediction of
outcome probabilities (Fig. 1). Thus, we could identify brain ar-
eas responding to probabilistic prediction of outcome probabil-
ities as opposed to certain outcome probabilities and to com-
pletelyunknownoutcomeprobabilities.Ourdesignensuredthat




rial design with four levels (CS, risk, ambiguity, and ignorance).
Twenty healthy right-handed participants (10 male, 10 female, mean
age  SD: 27.4  5.8 years) were recruited from the general population
and given monetary compensation of £40 for participation. Handedness
was controlled with the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield,
1971) (mean  SD: 83.6  23.2). All participants gave written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Independent variable
There were four levels for the independent variable “condition,” which
variedoneachtrialinanevent-relateddesign.(1)Aperceptuallydistinct
CSservedasinternalbaselineconditionandsignaledtheabsenceofthe
UCS on this trial. (2) In the risk condition, one of three previously





rate of 20% per bit. Thus, participants were unable to generate a point
estimate of outcome probabilities, although a probabilistic prediction
was possible by taking into account the second-order distribution of
underlying risky CS. This condition was signaled to participants by a
grayframearoundtheCS.Eachof16possiblestimuliappearedatleast
once,whiletheirfrequenciesweredeterminedbythenoiserate.Afterthe
expectancy period, together with the UCS, the original underlying CS
was shown on the screen. UCS contingency of ambiguous cues was de-
termined by the UCS contingency of the underlying risky cue. Critically,
occurrence of the underlying CS, and thus the frequency of electric
shocks, was identical between the risk and the ambiguity condition (Fig.
2F). (4) In the ignorance condition, a completely new set of CS was
presented, which had the same internal structure and CS–UCS contin-
gency as the ambiguity stimuli. However, different symbols were used,
and the internal pattern of each stimulus was reversed from left to right.
Thus,itwasnotpossibletopredicttheoutcome
of these stimuli, and each single stimulus did
not occur often enough to fully learn outcome
contingencies.
Stimuli
CS. CS stimuli in all conditions consisted of
four pieces (i.e., information bits) that could
take two different states. In one stimulus set, a
combination of four rectangles was used that
could be either yellow or blue. In the other set,
each of four geometrical symbols could be ei-
ther a circle or a triangle (Fig. 2B). The use of
thesetwostimulussetswasbalancedacrosspar-
ticipants, so that one half received the colored
rectangles as risk/ambiguity stimuli and the
dark green symbols as ignorance stimuli, and
vice versa for the other half. A white frame in-
dicated the risk, or noiseless, condition, and a gray frame (40%) the
ambiguity, or noise, condition (Fig. 2C,D). No frame was presented in
the ignorance condition (Fig. 2E). A light blue rectangle without frame
servedasCSinbothstimulussets(Fig.2A).Allstimuliwerepresented
on a black background, randomly either above or below the screen
center.
UCS.Asunconditionedstimulus,participantsreceivedanaversive500
Hz train of electrical pulses (square wave, individual pulse duration: 200
s, total duration: 500 ms, individually adjusted current, mean  SD:
14.3  4.3 mA), delivered via pediatric ECG electrodes (DENIL10026,
Spes Medica) to the left hand. Stimulation intensity was determined
before the experiment started and was set slightly below the pain toler-
ance. After the procedure was explained to participants, discomfort and
pain thresholds were roughly assessed with ascending stimulation inten-
sity. Random stimulus intensities were then delivered around the pain
threshold to establish a stimulus-percept function. The random proce-
dure was repeated after the experiment. There was no change in percep-
tionofthestimulibetweenthepreexperimentandpostexperimentmea-
surements ( p  0.70).
Experimental procedure
Pavlovian fear conditioning. After participants arrived in the laboratory,
the task was fully explained and the UCS level was determined as de-
scribed above. Participants then engaged in a pavlovian learning task to
condition the different CS–UCS contingencies (CS: no UCS, CS:
0.25, 0.50, and 0.75). They were not informed about the nature of the
learning task; however, instructions included a statement that “after
some symbols, electric stimulation will be more frequent than after oth-
ers.” Pavlovian conditioning was conducted in the scanner environment
withthescannerrunningtoensureanidenticalcontextbetweenlearning
and the subsequent critical experimental paradigm. Each of the four CS
(CS and three CS) occurred 20 times in pseudorandomized order.
Toensurelearning,skinconductanceresponses(SCRs)wererecorded
in a subsample of 14 participants, while in the remaining 6 participants,
SCR was not recorded due to a technical failure. Recordings were made
on thenar/hypothenar of the left hand using 8 mm Ag/AgCl cup elec-
trodes (EL258, Biopac Systems). Constant voltage was provided by an
integrated skin conductance preamplifier (AT64, Autogenic Systems).
Thesignalwasconvertedtoanopticalpulse(minimumresolution7Hz),
digitally converted with 100 Hz sampling rate (Micro1401, Cambridge
Electronic Design), and recorded (Spike2, Cambridge Electronic De-
sign). Further analysis was performed in Matlab (Version 7.1., Math-
Works). The signal was temporally filtered with a bidirectional Gaussian
kernel of 0.5 s full duration at half maximum and high-pass filtered with
a first order Butterworth filter and a cutoff frequency of 0.0159 Hz,
corresponding to a time constant of 10 s. After visual inspection for
artifacts, anticipatory conditioned reaction was calculated as mean SCR
during CS presentation, corrected for 1 s baseline before stimulus onset.
Learning was modeled using a simple Rescorla–Wagner rule (Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972), assuming a learning rate of   0.3 and initial
outcome prediction values of 0.5 for all four CS. For each individual
participant, a trial-by-trial general linear model was then fitted, using
Figure1. Examplesforoutcomepredictionafterrisky,ambiguous,orignorancecues,visualizedbyasecond-orderdistribution
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distribution, and prediction error on the last
trial as regressors. Beta estimates of these mod-
els were analyzed on the group level using one-
samplettests.ResponsestoCSandCSwere
additionallyaveragedacrosstrialsandanalyzed
in a one way ANOVA model using the GLM
approach in SPM 12.0 (SPSS).
Scanning. After the pavlovian conditioning,
the concept of noisy reception was explained as
well as the occurrence of completely new sym-
bols in the ignorance condition (see instruc-
tions in supplemental methods). During the
scanning experiment, 45 stimuli for the risk,
ambiguity, and ignorance conditions were pre-
sented in pseudorandomized order. Fifteen in-
terspersedCSservedasinternalbaseline(that
is, as null events) to allow recovery of blood
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal in re-
gions of interest.
Intratrial procedure
At the beginning of each trial, a CS was pre-
sentedfor5.2s(Fig.3).Participantsweretasked
to indicate the position of the CS (above or be-
low the screen center) with a button press as
quickly as possible, while between responses,
they held down a resting button. After the CS
disappeared, the outcome was signaled at the
center of the screen by a lightning-style sign to
indicate shock (which was delivered concur-
rently) or with the words “no shock.” In the
ambiguity condition, the original “risky” CS
was shown in place of the ambiguous CS. Af-
ter 0.5 s, these signs disappeared and 0.7 s later,
a fixation cross was shown during the intertrial
period. The intertrial interval was jittering be-
tween 4.8 s and 7.8 s resulting in a mean trial
onset asynchrony of 12.7 s.
Image acquisition
Images were acquired ona3TAllegra head
scanner(SiemensMedicalSystems)withahead
coil for RF transmission and signal reception.
Fieldmapswereacquiredwithastandardman-
ufacturer’sdoubleechogradientechofieldmap
sequence (TE, 10.0 and 12.46 ms; TR, 1020 ms;
matrix size, 64  64), using 64 slices covering
the whole head (voxel size, 3  3  3 mm).
Forfunctionalimages,weusedBOLDsignal-
sensitive T2*-weighted transverse single-shot
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI; flip
angle , 90°; bandwidth BW, 3551 Hz/pixel;
phase-encoding (PE) direction, anterior–pos-
terior; bandwidth in PE direction BWPE, 47.3
Hz/pixel;TE,30ms;effectiveTR,2600ms).The
manufacturer’s standard automatic 3D-shim
procedure was performed at the beginning of
each experiment. Each volume contained 40
slices of 2 mm thickness (1 mm gap between
slices; field of view, 192  192 mm
2; matrix
size, 64  64). BOLD sensitivity losses in the
orbitofrontalcortexandtheamygdaladuetosusceptibilityartifactswere
minimizedbyapplyingaz-shimgradientmomentof0.4mT/mms,a
slice tilt of 30°, and a positive PE gradient polarity (Weiskopf et al.,
2006, 2007). In two scanning sessions, 377 and 382 functional whole-
brain volumes were acquired. The first 4 volumes, or 10.4 s, of each
session were discarded to obtain steady-state longitudinal magnetiza-
tion.Eachsessionwasconcludedby8volumes,or20.8s,withoutstimuli.
Whole-brain anatomical scans were acquired using a modified driven
equilibrium Fourier transform (MDEFT) sequence with optimized pa-
rametersasdescribedpreviously(Deichmannetal.,2004).Onehundred
seventy-six sagittal partitions were acquired with an image matrix of
256  224 (read  phase) and twofold oversampling in read direction





























































For each cue, its frequency during the whole experiment is indicated as well as the probability of electric shock after this cue,
averagedoverthewholeexperiment.Bothfrequencyandshockprobabilityweredeterminedbythechancethatthiscuewas
derivedfromanyofthethreeunderlyingriskycues,givenanoiserateof0.2perinformationbit.
1650 • J.Neurosci.,February11,2009 • 29(6):1648–1656 Bachetal.•PassivePredictionofAmbiguityandRiskbloodvessels.Theflipangleofthetaggingpulsewaschosentobe160°to
account for B1 losses in the neck. Special RF excitation pulses were used
to compensate for B1 inhomogeneities of the transmit coil in superior/
inferior and anterior/posterior directions. Images were reconstructed by
performing a standard 3D Fourier Transform, followed by modulus cal-
culation.Nodatafilteringwasappliedink-spaceorintheimagedomain.
Image analysis
Images analyzed with statistical parametric
mapping (SPM 5; Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) on
Matlab (version 7.1., MathWorks). EPI images
were generated off-line from the complex
k-space raw data using a generalized recon-
struction method based on the measured EPI
k-space trajectory to minimize ghosting. They
were then corrected for geometric distortions
caused by susceptibility-induced field inhomo-
geneities. A combined approach was used
which corrects for both static distortions and
changesinthesedistortionsduetoheadmotion
(Andersson et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2002).
The static distortions were calculated for each
subject from a field map that was processed us-
ing the FieldMap toolbox as implemented in




associated with head motion. The motion-
corrected images were then coregistered to the
individual’s anatomical MDEFT image using a
12-parameter affine transformation, and nor-
malized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) T1 reference brain template (resampled
voxel size 2  2  2 mm). Normalized images
were smoothed with an isotropic 8 mm full-
width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. The
time series in each voxel were high-pass filtered
at 1/128 Hz to remove low-frequency con-
founds. We modeled the presentation of cues
foreachtrialtypeasaseparateboxcarregressor
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function. In fear conditioning studies,
phasic responses to CS onset are often ob-
served in the amygdala (see, for example,
Bu ¨cheletal.,1998;Labaretal.,1998)andoccur
early rather than late during CS presentation
(Cheng et al., 2007). To assess such responses,
we modeled cue onset with a stick function,
thusenhancingsensitivityforearlyresponsesto
cue onset, and analyzed responses to CS
CS and to the shock probability. In both
models, outcome onset and outcome valence
(shockornoshock)wereincludedasadditional
regressors. To account for serial acquisition of
different slices in one volume, time derivatives
for each regressor were included into the
model.
Position of cue (and thus, the type of motor
response), response latency, motor speed, and
thecorrectnessofresponsewerenormalizedfor
each participant, convolved with a hemody-
namic response function, and, together with
their time derivatives, orthogonalized with re-
specttoeachotherandincludedintothemodel
as regressors of no interest. Further regressors
of no interest were movement parameters de-
rived from the realignment procedure and cor-
rection regressors for variance caused by the
cardiac cycle (Glover et al., 2000). Statistical
parametric maps were generated from linear contrasts of interest (ambi-
guity  risk, ambiguity ignorance) in each participant. A second level
random effect analysis (RFX) was then performed using one-sample t
tests on contrast images obtained in each participant for each compari-
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tive conjunction analysis was performed on the second level, testing
against conjunction null (Friston et al., 2005; Nichols et al., 2005). We
reportclusterswithavoxel-levelthresholdofp0.001(uncorrected).In
regions of interest for which we had prior hypotheses (posterior inferior
frontal gyrus/sulcus, anterior insula, posterior parietal cortex, orbito-
frontal and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and amygdala), results were
small-volume corrected for familywise error within a sphere of 15 mm
diameter around peak coordinates as reported by Huettel et al. (2006)
andHsuetal.(2005),andreportedatavoxel-levelthresholdofp0.05.
Fortheconjunctionanalysis,small-volumecorrectionwasperformedon
peak coordinates from main contrasts. BOLD responses outside of re-
gions of interest are reported at a cluster-level threshold of p  0.05,
whole-brain corrected for familywise error.
Behavioral data analysis
The effect of the condition factor on reaction time measures and task
performance was analyzed in a one-way factorial design, using GLM
procedures in SPSS 12.0.
Results
Pavlovian conditioning
During pavlovian conditioning, anticipatory skin conductance
responses (conditioned reactions, CR) were greater for the CS
than for the CS (F(1,12)  22.9; p  0.001). Predicted outcome
was significantly correlated with CR (t(13)  2. 4; p  0.05),
showingthatparticipantslearnedtheCS–UCScontingencies.Af-
ter conditioning, we tested for typical brain responses associated
with conditioned stimuli. By modeling phasic responses to pre-
dictive cue onset we observed enhanced activity in left amygdala
for the contrast of CS (i.e., risky cues) compared with CS,
survivingsmall-volumecorrectionwithasphereof15mmdiam-
eter around peak coordinates reported previously for phasic
amygdala responses in fear conditioning (Morris and Dolan,
2004). Across the three CS, activity in the ventral striatum
showed a linear increase with increasing probability of negative
outcome, surviving small-volume correction with a sphere of 15
mm diameter around peak coordinates reported for representa-
tion of outcome probability (Tobler et al., 2007) (additional in-
formation can be found in supplemental Table 1, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Behavioralresponsestotheconcurrent task
During the critical phase of the experiment, participants were
tasked to respond to the position of the cue, to provide a broad
measure for attention. Thus, we were able to test whether our
experimental manipulation influenced cognitive processes re-
lated to a concurrent task. There was no effect of the condition
factoronmeanandvarianceofoverallreactiontimesorresponse
latency, or on task performance ( p  0.30 for all ANOVAs).
BOLDresponsestocontrastsof interest
Our critical contrasts of interest related to the postlearning pe-
riod and involved evoked responses to presentation of ambigu-
ous and risky, and ambiguous and ignorance cues, respectively.
Enhanced differential responses to ambiguous compared with
risky stimuli were found bilaterally in posterior inferior frontal
gyrus (pIFG), extending into middle frontal gyrus (MFG), and
bilaterally in the posterior superior parietal lobule (pPAR) in
Brodmann area 7 (Table 1, Fig. 4A,B). All of these clusters sur-
vived small-volume correction around peak coordinates as re-
ported by Huettel et al. (2006). Additional clusters that survived
whole-brain correction were found in occipitotemporal cortex
including higher visual areas. We did not observe any activation












Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrus 44,45 Right 50 4.53 52,14,14;58,10,26
44,9 Left 147 4.87 52,10,26;42,2,30
Posteriorsuperiorparietallobule 7 Right 44 4.41 34,50,50;30,58,44
7 Left 93 4.97 26,54,46
Middlefrontalgyrus 9 Right 15 4.22 40,10,30
Fusiformgyrus,inferiortemporalgyrus,andparahippocampalgyrus* 19 Right 536 5.97 32,56,8;30,68,10;
44,54,4
Fusiformgyrusandmiddletemporalgyrus* 37 Left 188 5.41 44,58,0;52,60,2;
28,68,10
Ambiguityignorance
Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrusandmiddlefrontalgyrus 44,46,9 Right 605 5.47 42,16,24;58,16,16;44,4,28
Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrus 46 Right 69 4.82 36,32,8;34,24,4
Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrusandmiddlefrontalgyrus 9 Left 232 5.26 52,8,30;44,6,30;48,6,38
Posteriorsuperiorandinferiorparietallobule 7 Right 86 4.48 30,58,44;30,64,50
Occipitalcortex* 18,37,17 Bilateral 4229 8.31 30,82,8;32,46,14;
10,88,6
Middletemporalgyrusandprecuneus* 19 Left 173 5.27 34,82,20;28,76,38
Conjunction:(ambiguityrisk)and(ambiguityignorance)
Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrus 9 Right 10 4.0 54,14,14
Middlefrontalgyrus 44 Right 26 4.17 44,12,30
Posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrus 9 Left 69 4.26 50,8,26
Posteriorsuperiorparietallobule 7 Right 3 3.68 30,60,44
Fusiformgyrusandparahippocampalgyrus* 19,37 Right 566 4.77 28,70,14;38,52,14;
30,56,8
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pared with ignorance stimuli revealed a set of clusters similar to
the above contrast. Specifically, we observed pIFG clusters ex-
tendingintomiddlefrontalgyrus(MFG)ontheright(Fig.4C,D).
The contrast also showed enhanced posterior parietal responses
in the right hemisphere. All of these clusters survived small-
volumecorrectionaroundpeakcoordinatesasreportedbyHuet-
tel et al. (2006). Additional clusters that survived whole-brain
correction were found in occipitotemporal regions. We did not
observe activations that were stronger in response to ignorance
than to ambiguity cues.
To identify brain areas that showed a greater response to am-
biguous than to both risky and ignorance
cues,weperformedaconjunctionanalysis.
This analysis revealed enhanced responses
in bilateral pIFG, extending into right
MFG. A small cluster in right pPAR also
showed conjoint responses across both
contrasts (Figs. 4E,F, 5). All of these clus-
ters survived small-volume correction
around peak coordinates from individual
contrasts. Additionally, occipitotemporal
areas, including visual areas, responded to
ambiguouscuesandsurvivedwhole-brain
correction.
In an exploratory analysis, ignorance
and risk were contrasted. No activations
were observed that were significantly
greater to ignorance than to risk cues. Ce-
rebral responses in the primary visual cor-
texweregreaterforriskthanforignorance
cues and are summarized in supplemental
Table 2 (available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material).
Discussion
The present study examined neural re-
sponses to perception of ambiguity in the
absence of choice. We show that within
posteriorinferiorfrontalgyrus(pIFG)and
posterior parietal cortex (pPAR), two
brain regions previously reported to en-
code decision making about ambiguous
outcomes(Huetteletal.,2006)respondto
theperceptionofambiguityintheabsence
of decision making. As our paradigm in-
volved negative outcomes, namely painful
electric shocks, it appears brain regions
previously associated with ambiguity of
reward prediction respond also to ambi-
guity in aversive predictions. Critically,
these responses occur only when a lack of
informationinoutcomepredictionscould
potentially be known. That is, neural re-
sponses evoked by ambiguity are not cor-
related with the distribution width of the
outcome prediction, which is highest un-
der complete ignorance, but rather with





behavioral planning (Lee et al., 2007; Sakagami and Watanabe,
2007; Tanji et al., 2007). Most notably for the present study,
where no actual behavior was required in response to the cues, it
was suggested that the LPFC is involved in maintaining a state
representation in a given environment (Lee et al., 2007). The
LPFC area has also been parsed into functionally specific subre-
gions on a dorsal/ventral (Tanji and Hoshi, 2008) or on an ante-
rior/posterior axis (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). In the
presentstudy,LPFCactivationwasobservedinaposteriordorsal
area, the pIFG. It has been suggested that the ventral LPFC is
moreinvolvedinprocessingspecific,object-relatedinformation,
Figure 4. BOLD responses to ambiguous cues, compared with risky or ignorance cues. Clusters are overlaid on a mean T1-
weighted image from all participants, and displayed at a voxel-level threshold of p  0.001 (uncorrected) and small-volume
correctionwithregardtopeakcoordinatesofpreviousstudiesasindicatedinthemethodssection.A,BilateralpIFGresponsesto
ambiguous compared with risky cues. B, Bilateral pPAR and occipital responses to ambiguous compared with risky cues. C,
BilateralpIFGresponsestoambiguouscomparedwithignorancecues.D,RightpPARandbilateraloccipitalresponsestoambig-
uous compared with ignorance cues. E, Bilateral pIFG responses to ambiguous compared with both risky and ignorance cues
(conjunctionanalysis,testingagainstconjunctionnull).F,RightpPARandbilateraloccipitalresponsestoambiguouscompared
withbothriskyandignorancecues(conjunctionanalysis,testingagainstconjunctionnull).
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volved in more general functions of mon-
itoring strategic behavior (Tanji and
Hoshi, 2008). A framework for a hierar-
chical anterior/posterior distribution of
functions, the cascade model (Koechlin
and Summerfield, 2007), proposes that
simple stimulus–response relationships
are controlled by premotor regions alone,
while more contextual cues draw on the
posterior prefrontal cortex, with conflict-
inginformationdrawingonevenmorean-
terior regions. Within these two accounts
of LPFC subregions, dorsal pIFG activa-
tion noted in the present study, as well as
in the study by Huettel et al., might reflect a representation of a
contextual cue that requires more than mere sensorimotor con-
trol. Although in the experimental task, no behavioral response
tothecueswasnecessary,inaneverydayenvironment,economic
ambiguity might provide a strong incentive to search for hidden
information during an anticipation period, thus overriding sim-
ple sensorimotor processes. This search could be under the con-
trol of pIFG, even in the absence of an actual decision. This is in
linewithapreviousstudyexamininganoneconomiccontextand
showing activity in the same areas during outcome prediction
when contextual cues implied uncertainty (Huettel et al., 2005).
This speculation is also supported by the finding that the pIFG
responds to economic situations requiring further information
search, for example sudden changes in the reward landscape
within a dynamic economic game (Li et al., 2006).
We found a region within pPAR (namely BA 7) activated in
responsetoambiguityasopposedtoriskandignorance.Thisarea
shares connections with the prefrontal cortex (Tanji and Hoshi,
2008) which have been suggested to convey integrated sensory
information to executive areas, the strength of which may medi-
ate the effectiveness of executive control (Jung and Haier, 2007).
Parietalareasresponsibleforsensoryintegrationrepresentacrit-
ical decision variable in perceptual decision making (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007) and are implicated in valuation of economic
choices (see, for example, Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Dorris and
Glimcher, 2004; Glimcher et al., 2005). The responses we ob-
served in this region can be construed as reflecting value calcula-
tions, and these calculations are necessarily more complex for
ambiguous than for risky or ignorance trials due to the second-
orderprobabilitydistributionofambiguousoutcomes.However,
sinceexperimentalcuesdifferednotonlyintheinformationthey
conveyed but also in color and shape, pPAR responses could
conceivably reflect these sensory differences. We think this is
unlikely given that differences in these sensory attributes would
be expected to be reflected in differential responses in earlier
stages of processing, such as visual areas in the occipital cortex.
Finally, a competing explanation for different responses be-
tween conditions relates to general attentional differences as, for
example, between risk and ambiguity. However, our behavioral
data indicate no such difference with respect to reaction time
measures and task performance. For additional control, we also
covaried reaction times and task performance out of the BOLD
signal.Finally,wenotethereisnoeasyformalizationofattention
and in so far as risk and ambiguity embody greater or lesser
requirements for information search then it can be argued that






tribution of outcome probabilities (Becker and Brownson, 1964;
Larson, 1980; Curley et al., 1986; Pulford and Colman, 2008),
which implies a probabilistic prediction of outcome probabili-
ties. This key concept of lack of information about outcome
probabilities has been translated as uncertainty of outcomes, or
the distribution width of outcome predictions (Yates and
Zukowski,1976).Inourexperiment,anymeasureofdistribution
width of possible outcomes is highest for ignorance and lowest
for the risk condition. Since in many experiments on economic
ambiguity, the second-order outcome is hidden from the ob-
server, an alternative view involves reformulation of economic
ambiguity as “not knowing relevant information that could be
known” (Camerer, 1995; p. 645). This quantity is highest in the
ambiguity condition in our study.
We failed to identify any brain region responding to uncer-
tainty of outcomes that showed greater responses for ignorance
over ambiguity and at the same time for ambiguity over risk.
Indeed, virtually all neural responses to ambiguity compared
with risk were also evident when ambiguity was compared with
ignorance. Therefore, the critical aspect of ambiguity in our ex-
periment, in terms of observable neural activity, was not uncer-
tainty in itself but the fact that the missing information was hid-
dentotheobserverandcouldpotentiallyberevealed.Thisfitsan
interpretation of ambiguity as a contextual cue necessitating fur-
ther search for information before the outcome occurs, i.e., dur-
ing the anticipation period. In contrast, under complete igno-
rance of outcome distributions, an optimal strategy might
involve sampling from outcomes rather than looking for infor-
mation in the environment. This is reflected in phenomena such
as novelty seeking (Wittmann et al., 2008), as opposed to ambi-
guity aversion. The potential to gain knowledge of hidden out-
comeinformationisthereforeacriticalfactorforbrainresponses
observed here.
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over ignorance compatible with those of Huettel et al. (2006).
An alternative explanation for these findings relates to the
computational demand which is also highest in the ambiguity
condition compared with both other condition. Both explana-
tions however indicate that uncertainty of outcomes is not the
factor modulating cerebral responses in the present study.
Whether it is also critical for actual economic decisions under
ambiguity cannot be answered within our paradigm.
Ambiguityandthe amygdala
In contrast to the present experiment, a previous fMRI study has
suggested that the amygdala and dorsomedial prefrontal and or-
bitofrontal cortex underlie decision making under ambiguity
(Hsu et al., 2005). This is consistent with a framework of the
amygdala as a detector of ambiguity (Whalen, 1998) elaborated
to explain why the amygdala is more activated in response to
fearful(thatsupposedlydonotclearlyindicatewhetherathreatis
present)thantoangryfaces(Whalenetal.,2001),andwhyamyg-
dala responses during fear conditioning quickly habituate [sup-
posedly because they reflect uncertainty about CS–UCS contin-
gencies (Bu ¨chel et al., 1998)]. Although it is obvious that the
amygdala responds to some kinds of uncertainty [e.g., temporal
unpredictability (Herry et al., 2007)], different forms of uncer-
tainty have not been formally compared with regard to such re-
sponses.Thekindofoutcomeuncertaintydescribedintheafore-
mentioned work is likely to be different from the economic
definitionappliedinthepresentstudy(e.g.,thelackofknowledge
about CS–UCS contingencies in fear conditioning paradigms
correspondstotheignoranceandnottheambiguityconditionin
the present study). The study by Hsu et al. (2005), although con-
cerned with an economic definition of ambiguity, in fact col-
lapsed different kinds of “ambiguous” situations for analysis of
fMRIdata,thatis,monetarygamblesfollowingastricteconomic
definition, but also quizzes, and uninformed gambles against an
informed opponent. Together, the data indicate that there is no
entirely convincing empirical evidence that the amygdala re-
sponds to ambiguity as defined in a strict economic sense, an
inference upheld by our present findings, although such a role of
the amygdala cannot be discounted entirely (Seymour and
Dolan, 2008).
Individualattitudestoriskand ambiguity
The approach taken in the present paradigm entailed dispensing
with any active decisions to study the brain response to percep-
tion of stimuli per se. This makes it difficult to directly infer
participants’attitudestowardthesecuesasintermsofformalized
neuroeconomicmodelsthatincorporateindividualriskandam-
biguity preferences. Previous imaging studies have shown that
neural responses to risky and ambiguous situations might de-
pendonsuchindividualattitudes(Hsuetal.,2005;Huetteletal.,
2006). The present study however was not designed to test such
relations although we acknowledge their likely importance.
Conclusions
Ambiguityisanimportantaspectofuncertaintyindecisionmak-
ing. Here, we draw on the definition of ambiguity as a lack of
informationthatcouldpotentiallybeknownandoperationalized
it as a probabilistic prediction of outcomes in a pavlovian condi-
tioningparadigm.Intheabsenceofanydecisions,weshowthata
networkcomprisingthepIFGandpPARrespondstothepercep-
tion of ambiguity as opposed to risk (point estimate of outcome
probabilities) or ignorance (uniform distribution of outcome
probabilities). This corresponds to a network previously been
implicated in decisions involving ambiguity. We conclude that
the critical factor for these responses to ambiguity is anticipation
of an outcome when information about outcome probabilities is
hidden, but potentially knowable. pIFG responses might sub-
serve contextual analysis when search of hidden information is
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